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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

S'TATE OF UTAH

RAMONA HAYWARD,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

Case No. 8525

LEO GEORGE EASTMAN,
Defendant and Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an automobile accident case. The Plaintiff
filed suit against the Defendant. The case was tried to
a jury and the jury brought in a verdict of no cause of
action.
The Defendant and his friend, Kenneth R. Parry,
were going east in his automobile and hit the Plaintiff
and her companion, Mrs. Fay Osborne, while they were
behind the car in which they had been riding, crushing
them between the two cars.
The accident occurred about a mile and a half west
of Fort Herriman on the Lark-Herriman road, U. S.
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Highway No. 111 at about 1 a.IIL on November 26, 1953.
(Ex. 41, officer's report).
The highway at the point of the accident was a
blacktop road, sixteen feet wide, with shoulders of varying widths. (Map, Ex. 32), (Photographs Ex. 29, 4, 42,
45), (Officers report Ex. 41), (R. 246), and with a faint
yellow line in the middle. There was a slight down grade
with a slight curve for a distance of about 500 feet to
the west, C~Iap, Ex. 28,) (Photographs, Ex. 4, 29, 3, 45),
(Officers report Ex. 41), (R. 258, 259, 141, 142), and
with a sharp curve 600 feet to the west. (Map, Ex. 28),
(Photographs, Ex. 2), (R. 246, 385, 141). Vision was not
obs,cured. It was on a clear night. The ~t-oad was dry
with no defects. (R. 278). It was in open country. The
automobile in which the Plaintiff had been riding was
parked on the side of the road. The accident occurred
close to a telephone pole which could be seen 400 to 500
feet from the west. (R. 142, 218, 232, 248), (Officers
report, Ex. 41, and maps).
The Plaintiff, Ramona Hayward, and her husband
and family were living in Riverton at the time of the
accident. During the afternoon prior to the accident,
Plaintiff went to her friend, Mrs. Fay Osborne's home
to assist her in preparing Thanksgiving dinner that they
were going to have .at the Osborne residence on Thanksgiving d·ay.
Mr. Francis Osborne can1e hon1e from work about
r> o'clock (R. 112), and then went to the store. While'
he was away, Ralph Crane, a relative of the Osbornes',
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came to the Osborne home. Mr. Osborne returned home
from the store about 9 o'clock (R. 113) and after they
had something to eat, Mrs. Osborne wanted some Kool
cigarettes and suggested that they· go to Riverton to
buy them. So the Plaintiff and Mrs. Osborne and Mr.
Osborne and Ralph Crane went to Riverton in the Osborne car. They went to Viv's and Arch's a restaurant
and beer parlor in Riverton. (R. 113, 114). They stayed
at Viv's and Arch's from about ten thirty to eleven thirty
and upon leaving decided to take a ride. (R. 113). They
went to West Jordan and from there to Lark. On their
way back, Mrs. Osborne stopped the automobile and
parked off the side of the road so that she could go to
the bathroom. (R. 114, ~15).
Plaintiff and Fay Osborne went to the bathroom on
a side hill. When they came back, Plaintiff looked both
ways. There were no ·cars coming so they started to go
behind their car. Plaintiff heard a noise and she looked
up. She could see car lights. She said, "Just a minute,
Fay, here comes a car," and she turned her head to see
if F·ay was with her and had stopped. Plaintiff turned
around to see where the car was. Just turned her head
and it was almost on her. She tried to step back, but
she couldn't move. She couldn't get out of the way.
She was scared. (R. 122, 123, 156). She estimated the
car was traveling 50 to 60 miles per hour and the car
came straight at her (R.157).
After the Plaintiff was hit, she tried to pick herself
up off the road. Her hands were in the gravel. She
tried to raise herself off the road, but couldn't. She was
3
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lying on her side with both legs bent under and the
bottom half of her legs were laid up against the top part
of her legs. (R. 124). She was picked up and put in
the front seat of the Osborne car and Mrs. Osborne was
put in the back seat of the Osborne car. Thereafter they
were transferred to Mr. Kaywood's car. Mr. Kaywood
lived close to where the accident happened and he drove
them to the Bingham Canyon hospital which was closed.
(R. 1.25). They then went to Midvale where they were
met by the ambulance (R. 180) and taken to the emergency hospital in Salt Lake City and given blood transfusions R. 180, 185). Plaintiff was in the St. Mark's hospital from November 26, 1953 to February 8, 1954, and
was back in the hospital five other times, leaving the hospital in a wheel chair on the 26th day of April, 1955, one
year and five months after the accident and thirty-four
days before the trial. (Ex. 9).
The Plaintiff contended that the car was being driven
by Leo George Eastman, the Defendant; but the Defendant contended that the car was being driven by Kenneth
R. Parry and not as his agent Plaintiff relied upon the
officer's report (Ex. 41) and the statement made by
Leo George Eastman to the police officers that he was
driving the ear (R. 362, 274, 280), and the conversation
between Mr. Hay"..ard and Mr. Osborne and Mr. EastDian, in which Mr. Eastman stated he was driving the
car. (R. 241, 242).
There was a lot of aspersions about Plaintiff's and
Mrs. Osborne's drinking; but there was very little actual
evidence of their drinking. The Plaintiff was not drunk
4
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and Mrs. Osborne had nothing to drink. They are the
two persons injured and involved in the accident. (R.
398, 235). The evidence on drinking of the respective
parties was that the Defendant, Eastman, had two cans
of beer at Viv's and Arch's (R. 355, 366), one drink of
beer at the Drift-Inn in Lark and opened a can of beer
on the way back to Riverton. (R. 367). Kenneth R. Parry
had two beers at Viv's and Arch's (R. 307), drank one
beer at the Drift-Inn in Lark (R. 309), and two cans of
beer were opened in the car on the way back to Riverton,
(R. 367), one can apiece. (R. 317).
That the Plaintiff had one beer in the afternoon at
the Osborne home and nothing else to drink during that
time (R. 147), one drink of whiskey before going to Viv's
and Arch's (R. 148), and one drink of beer at Viv's and
Arch's. (R. 114). That Mrs. Fay Osborne had nothing
whatsoever to drink. (R. 235).
Mike Humphrey, a mechanic at the Riverton Motor
Company, described the Osborne automobile and the
amount of blood that was in the automobile·. That there
was flesh on the right side, underneath on the cross beam
of the car (R. 164); that the left side of the car was
damaged and the left back panel had to be repaired and
the left tail light had to be repaired. (Repair order,
Ex. 11), (R. 167), and testified that both sides. of the
trunk of the Osborne car were bent. Each side of the
center of the hood of the Eastman car was damaged.
Hortense Wood, custodian of the records of the St.
Mark's Hospital, identified the hospital record of the
Plaintiff. (R. 172-174).
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Francis Osborne testified that the Eastman car went
30 to 35 feet after the accident, (R. 178) and that the
Osborne car went 70 to 80 feet (R. 178); and that thereafter they pushed the car out of the road. (R. 179).
That they put the girls in the Osborne car then transferred them to the Kaywood car went to Bingham, then
to Midvale, then to the County Hospital (R. 180), had
a conversation in which Eastman admitted driving the
car. (R. 182), and testified that the Eastman car turned
left across the road and that the Osborne car was knocked
straight down the road. (R. 183). That his car was
three feet on the pavement and three feet on the oil
when hit. He testified that he measured from the telephone pole to the curve sign and that it was 408 feet,
and that from the telephone pole to the sharp curve was
605 feet. (R. 215, 216), (Ex. 3). That a car parked at the
telephone post could be seen 500 feet away. (R. 218).
That the park lights on his car were turned on. (R. 215).
That Mr. Osborne on rebuttal testified that his car
was 6 feet, 2 inches from fender to fender and that the
wheel fro1n wheel to wheel outside 1neasure was 5 feet,
3 inches and that his car from bun1per to bumper was
16 feet, 3 inches. (R. 396).
Clara Fay Osborne testified that the Plaintiff was at
her ho1ne and that they went to ,~iv's and Arch's and
that she had nothing to drink. (R. 233, 235). That she
ren1P1nbered driving off the road, right side of car on the
dirt, seeing the telephone pole, taking the keys out of the
ignition and after that, she had an entire loss of memory
until she was in the hospital. (R. 237, 241). That Dr.
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Lamb testified that after injuries .and loss of blood, the
memory is often affected. (R. 212, 213).
Mrs. Osborne on rebuttal testified that she had put
the car in gear and that the park lights were on and that
Mrs. I-Iayward was not drunk. (R. 397 and 398).
Franklin S. Harris, Professor of Physical Science,
University of Utah, testified going to the scene of the
accident (R. 243 to 246), and making tests with a 1951
Ford, the same model as the Defendant's car, that the
car could be stopped in a distance of 66 feet, going 45
miles per hour. (R. 384). That a car parked on either
side of the telephone pole could be seen for a distance
of 400 feet to 500 feet. (R. 248, 249, 385, 386), (Ex. 28).
That it was approximately 600 feet to the sharp turn,
(R. 246) and if a person is looking, he can see taillights
from the sharp curve. That a car could be plainly seen
for 400 feet if parked on the east side of the telephone
pole or on the west side of the telephone pole. Drew
diagram (Ex. 28), and marked the places where he
carried on the experiments. That a car laying down
72 feet of skid marks would be going 42 miles per hour
(R. 387) and if it hit a car or object that would mean
the car would be going f.aster than 42 miles per hour.
If the car was going 15 miles per hour .at time of impact
and laid down 72 feet of skid marks, that would mean
the car was going faster than 43 miles per hour. (R. 388,
389). In addition to that, if the car also turned and
made marks on the pavement, it would be going still
faster (R. 389) and it it hit another object it would
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mean additional speed. That a car going 40 miles per
hour would travel during the reaction time 44 feet; at
50 miles per hour, 55 feet, at 60 miles per hour 66 feet;
and at 70 miles per hour, 77 feet. (R. 389, 390).
Dr. Lamb testified that he was called to the hospital
on November 26, 1953 ; that Plaintiff had a compound
fracture. That the bones of her legs were exposed to the
out side and the bone fragments were protruding through
the soft tissues and he took care of the fracture and put
screws in the bones to hold them together (R. 191 to 199).
That half or two thirds of the tissue in each leg had been
smashed and crushed. (R. 186). That he operated, removing the dead tissue and sutured the remaining tissue
(R. 186). Plaintiff was listed as critical on the hospital
records, meaning that she might die.
That he exhibited the x-rays (Ex. 18 through 24
inclusive) and described them in details, (R.188) explaining how it was necessary to scrape the bone, which is
called saucerization. (R.196). He stated it was necessary
to take some bone from the hip and graft it onto the leg
and described the operation of bone grafting. (R. 197).
Plaintiff left the hospital on April 26, 1955, in a wheel
chair. That l\frs. Hayward might have to return to the
hospital and that the bone graft may not be successful.
Exhibit 9 shows that the hospital bill is $3,509.95. Exhibit 10 shows that Dr. Lamb's bill is $1,617.75 up to
date of trial.
William Tipton testified that he had drawn the map
to scale, (Ex. 32), (R. 259), and identified a picture
8
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taken by him 200 feet west of the telephone pole. (Ex.
29). That he had taken Exhibit 30 which is 50 feet west
of the telephone pole (R. 256), and that he had taken
the picture (Ex. 31), (R. 257) which is looking west from
100 feet east of the telephone pole. That it is 400 feet
from the telephone pole to the sign. (R. 260, 261) and
an additional 200 fet to the first sharp turn (R. 261),
(Ex. 33), that the map was drawn to scale and the survey
shows very little curve. (Ex. 28).
Carl George, the deputy sheriff of Salt Lake· County,
made the investigation, and arrived at the scene of the
accident at 2 :08 a.m. The accident occurred about 1 a.m.
See exhibit 41. The accident occurred about one and
one half miles west of Fort Herriman. That he measured
72 feet of skid marks. (R. 267), (Officers report, Ex. 41,
Map Ex. 32).
He identified exhibit 34 and 35 and that they were\
introduced in evidence over Plaintiff's objection, (R. 270),
identified the automobiles in exhibit 36 as being the
Eastman car and in exhibit 37 as being the Osborne car.
(R. 271).
He talked to Mr. Parry and Mr. Eastman at the
scene of the accident, that they had something to drink
(R. 274), that Mr. Eastman told him that he was driving
the automobile (R. 274). That the skid marks were 3
feet, 6 inches from the center of the highway, (R. 275,
276.) That the skid marks were on the left hand side
going east. He didn't go back to the scene of the accident
(R. 276) and had never seen the photographs until the
9
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afternoon of the trial, that he marked on the accident
report that vision was not obscurred, the pavement was
dry, and no defe·cts. (R. 278). The Eastman car was
going 40 miles an hour; he thinks he got this information
from Defendant, Eastman. The Eastman car went 32
feet after the impact. (R. 279). The Osborne car
traveled 84 feet after the impact. (R. 279). He made
some rough notes at the scene of the accident and they
were his original work sheets which is part of exhibit
41, (R. 281). That he had written over some of his marks
(R. 282). He has it marked on his work sheet, girls 35
feet, but doesnt remember what it means. (R. 283).
That he determined the point of impact as being 1110
of a mile from the Kaywood residence (R. 284). That
72 feet of skid marks is a line running down the left
side of the Defendant's car. That the map shows 40
inches which is 3 feet, 6 inches from the center line to
the left front 'vheel (R. 284), (Ex.. 41), that he marked
74 feet or inches to a tree, couldn't remember what the
measuren1ent was for. The statement made by Kenneth
R. Parry was part of the report (Ex. 41). He drew a
map on the yellow accident report sheet (Ex. 41) and that
as part of the report, he stated car number two (the
Osborne car) parked on side of road; car number 1, (the
Eastman car) going east, hit two ladies that were standing at rear of car number two, knocking both ladies up
ag-ainst the bu1nper of car nmnber t"'O. He got this
information partly from ~Ir. Eastman, partly from Mr.
Parry, and fron1 observation. (R. 286). Officers report
introduced as evidence (R. 286), that he got the full skid
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marks of the rear tire as 72 feet (R. 287, 288), did not
smell the breath of Mr. Eastman or Mr. Parry (R. 288),
said there was very little blood on the pavement (R. 288),
did not examine the shoulder of the road for skid marks
(R. 289). That his report shows that the car traveled
32 feet after impact, although he put 2·4 feet on the
board. (R. 292). That the Osborne car was in gear.
(R. 295, 296).
Archie C. Brown, one of the owners of Viv's and
Arch's, testified that he didn't let anyone pour liquor in
his place (R. 300), that he has known Mr. Eastman for
12 years and that he comes to his place quite often, and
that Kenneth R. Parry comes to his place quite often,
oftener than Eastman. (R. 300). He doesn't know how
many glasses of beer that he served to anyone that night.
(R. 301).
Ralph Crane testified that he went to the Osborne
home about 9 o'clock. He had been drinking before he
arrived at the Osborne home. He doesn't recall drinking
whiskey at the Osborne home; doesn't know whether he
let anyone drink out of his bottle, that he saw the girls
laying in the road and in a minute or two thereafter he
helped put them in the Osborne car. (R. 304).
Kenneth R. Parry testified that he works for Archie
McFarland & Sons Packing Co., on the killing floor. He
had two glasses of beer at Viv's .and Arch's Tavern (R.
307), did not know Mrs. Hayward. Left Viv's and Arch's
at closing time; went to the Drift-Inn at Lark and did
some drinking there. That he drove the car back because
11
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Defendant hadn't had his Ford very long and they had
been talking about cars and he would like to drive the
car to see how it handled (R. 309, 317, 324). Saw two
people standing in the road facing each other; could see
they were women. Applied brakes, but slid into them.
(R. 310). His driving license had been revoked for
drunken driving (R. 315), took one can of beer apiece out
of the Drift-Inn with them (R. 317). Lights were good
and on high beam (R. 318), was driving 40 miles per
hour and was going 15 miles per hour at time of impact.
One girls fell directly back of car; other one toward
center (R. 318. Was familiar with the road, with the turn,
and with the particular place where the accident happened. (R. 318). Had been over the road a thousand times
girls (R. 320). Could only see west, up the road from the
opposite direction. (R. 319). Both girls turned around
before they were hit (R. 319, 320), applied brakes 10
to 15 feet before he slid into the girls. Girls were only
15 feet away from the Osborne car when they were put
into it. Could see up the road 75 feet where he hit the girls
(R. 320). Could only see west, up the road from the
telephone pole 100 feet in day time and 75 to 100 feet
at night (R. 321). Changed stories, could only see 50 to
75 feet with the lights of the car on a straightaway.
(R. 322, 323), drank two beers at \ . .iY"s and Arch's (R.
323), went to try out the car (R. 324). Did not see the
Osbornt} ear until he hit it (R. :3:25 ). Changed testimony,
could seP a long 'vay~ down the road (R. 327), when
confronted with his deposition.
12
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Occie Evans testified that he works for the Salt Lake
County Sheriff's Department. He helped Sheriff George
make the measurements. That the skid marks were on
the hard surface of the highway on the south or right
hand side of the road going east and that the skid marks
ended up on the dirt shoulder. (R. 330). Thinks possible
point of impact was about 20 feet east of the telephone
pole, (R. 331) and that he had written on the report,
car number two parked on side of road, car number one
going east. Hit two ladies who were standing at rear
of car number two, knocking both ladies up against
bumper of car number two. (R. 332).
Lyle Bates testified that he was a Claims Adjustor
.and Attorney for the Farmers Underwriters Association
(R. 334). He went to the scene of the accident and examined it and took pictures at the scene of the accident and
was allowed to make marks on the pictures (R. 350) and
conclusions as to what the pictures showed over Plaintiff's objection (R. 339) and that he testified that there
was blood .all over the place (R. 342). Pools of blood
were betwe·en 2 and 3 feet. (R. 342). Other skid marks
in Exhibit 38. (R. 343). Identified circle on hood where
car was damaged. (R. 351). Exhibit 43 shows or looks
like a line from a ·car with brakes on it.
Leo George Eastman, the Defendant, testified that
he was employed as a miner at Lark. That he went to
Viv's and Arch's and that he saw Ralph Crane, Mrs.
Hayward, and Mrs. Osborne. lie didn't see them drink
any liquor. (R. 354). Eastman didn't particularly notice
then and did not actually see them drink beer. (R. 354).

13
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

That he started talking to Kenneth R. Parry and that
he had two glasses of beer (R. 355). That he left Viv's
and Arch's at a quarter to 12 o'clock and went to Lark.
Had beer at Drift-Inn in Lark and took beer out with
them. Parry wanted to drive the car (R. 356). He let
him drive. Car was going 40 miles per hour at time of
accident (R. 356, 357). That he saw objects in the road;
he thought for a minute it was stock, either horses or
cows. Doesn't remember seeing the car at all. (R. 357).
That he did not see the girls until they were 25 feet away
from him. (R. 359). That the girls were facing east
and did not change their position. That they were 100
feet away when he first saw the objects in the road.
(R. 360). That the Osborne car only went 20 to 25 feet.
( R. 361). Mrs. Osborne, after the accident, was lying
along side of the yellow line and Mrs. Hayward was
lying to the right of her on the oil. (R. 361). The girls
were picked up and put in the Osborne car and then
transferred to the Kaywood car. (R. 364). That he had
Sealed Beam head lights. That he could see objects from
150 to 200 feet~ but could not see them 350 feet ahead
( R. :16-1). Went to Lark for beers. Went to Viv's and
Arch's for a beer, (R. 364, 365, 366). Opened the beers
in the ear. (R. 367). Put the place where the curve
started on the map a:nd initialed it. (R. 368), and testified
that the accident occurred right at the curve. (R. 369).
Said that Exhibit 2 showing sharp curve was substantially the way it looked at the time of the accident.
(R. 369). During the testitnony of Mr. Eastman, Mr.
H-ansen stated to the Court that the map was drawn to
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scale, there were 50 foot intervals, that it is 400 feet to
the curve sign, but if you followed the curve of the road
it is about 430 feet. (R. 371). That exhibit 44 and 45
were pictures where the accident occurred. Mr. Eastman testified that he could see about 300 to 400 feet
up the road in the day time (R. 372, 373). Could see 75
to 100 feet with lights (R. 373). In a straight line could
see 200 feet west of the telephone pole. (R. 374). Changed stories, could only see 100 feet (R. 376). Doesn't
know how far the lights would shine to the side of the
road (R. 377). Could see the car up the road approximately 80 feet (R. 380). Said place of impact was at
curve or 5 to 10 fe·et from the curve (R. 380.) Changed
testimonies and said could see the car up the road only
80 feet and admitted that in his deposition he testified
he said he could see up the road 150 feet (R. 381). That
the girls were 5 feet apart after the impact. (R. 378).
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE AS
A MATTER O·F LAW.

POINT II.
THE COURT IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY
AND FAILED TO· GIVE THE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTIONS.

POINT III.
THE COURT ERRO·RED IN ADMITTING CER.TAIN
TESTIMONIES.
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POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRORED IN
TESTIMONIES.

EX~CLUDING

CERTAIN

POINT V.
THE COURT ERRORED IN NOT ALLOWING THE
QUESTION OF LIGHTS AS ONE OF THE GROUNDS OF
NEGLIGEN~CE TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY.

POINT VI.
THE COURT ERRORED IN OVER EMPHASIZING INTOXICATION AS TO THE PLAINTIFF AND MINIMIZING
THE DEFENDANT'S INTOXI·CATION.

POINT VII.
THE COURT ERRORED IN OVER RULING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

POINT VIII.
THE COURT MADE ERRORS IN LAW OCCURRING BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER THE TRIAL.
ARGlT~IENT

POIXT I.
THE DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE AS
A MATTER OF LAW.

The argument "·hieh Plaintiff will make in regards
to Point Nu1nber 1 "ill also apply to Points Nmnbered 2,
5, 7 and 8.
We have divided Point Number 1, for convenience,
into 4 subdivi~ions .as follows: A. Speed: B. Lights;
C. Control: D. Failure to keep a proper look out.
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A. SPEED
Defendant was traveling at an excessive rate of
speed under the circumstances and conditions. The
evidence on speed is that there were 72 feet of skid
marks (R. 267), (Officer's report, Ex. 41). That the
Osborne car, which was in gear, was knocked 70 to 80
feet (R. 178), according to Mr. Osborne. According to
the officer's report, the car was down the road 84 feet.
The Eastman car swerved to the left, leaving tire marks
across the highway for 32 feet. (Officer's report, Ex. 41
and pictures.)
Professor Harris testified and according to Mr.
Hansen's chart (R. 388, 389), a car going 43 miles p.er
hour will lay down 73 feet of skid marks. The Eastman
car also knocked the Osborne car, which was in gear,
from 70 to 80 feet and in addition to all that, left tire
marks across the road which means that the car was
being driven at a terrific rate of speed under the circumstances and conditions.
Mrs. Hayward testified that she had neve·r seen a
car coming so fast on that road, and that she judged
it was going 50 to 60 miles per hour (R. 157).
It is interesting to note that Mr. Parry was trying
out Mr. Eastman's car, ·and it is fair to infer from the
facts that he was trying to see how much of a pick up
it had and how fast the car would go. The fact that the
accident did occur is strong evidence of excessive speed.
The f.act that the driver did not bring the car to a stop
within the vision in which he could see objects upon the
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road is also strong evidence of excessive speed or drunkenness.
The road was dry. There was only a slight curve.
Vision was not obscured.
B. LIGHTS
The final evidence on lights by the Defendant was
that he could only see 80 feet (R. 380) and it is apparently what he expected to be believed.
The final evidence on lights by Mr. Parry, was that
he could see 75 feet on a straightaway (R. 322, 323).
The defendants testimony was that they were traveling about 40 miles per hour which means they would
travel 44 feet during reaction time, and there were 72
feet of skid marks, total of 116 feet, and the car was still
traveling. So they were not driving at a speed within
which they could stop their car "~ithin the distance their
lights "·ould sho'v objects on the road; or if they were
lying about the distance they could see with the lights,
then they must have been going altogether too fast.
This is a far cry from having lights which will show
objects on the road 350 feet as required by the Utal1
Statute.
If this were the condition of the defendants' lights,
the car should not h.ave been going any 'vhere near the
speed defendants were traveling.
Mr. Eastman testified that he had sealed beam head
lights. If this were the case, of course they met the statu18
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tory requirements of showing objects on the road for 350
feet, and their evidence about lights is not true.

C. CONTROL
If the car had been under proper control, certainly
they could have turned the car to the left. The road was
dry. It was a clear night. No cars were coming from the
opposite direction and the road was practically straight.
Certainly if he had sealed beam head lights, which Eastman testified he had, the driver could have seen any
objects on the road in time to have turned to the left.
The car and the ladies did not move according to the
Defendant's testimony. According to Plaintiff's testimony, they couldn't get out of the way, they didn't have
time.
D. LOOKOUT
If the driver had been keeping a proper look out, he
would have seen the objects on the road and could have
either turned the car to the left or could have stopped the
car. Or if the driver had kept a proper look out, he would
have decreased the speed so he could stop within the
distance that his lights revealed objects on the highway.
Mr. Eastman and Mr. Parry made certain statements about how far they could see down the road which
testimony is contrary to the physical facts and cannot be
believed.
When testimony is contrary to the physical facts,
then that testimony should be disregarded. The following authorities so held:
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HAARSTICH vs. OREGON SHORT LINE RAILROAD CO., 70 U. 552, 262 P. 100. The Court says, page
104, bottom of the first column of the Pac. that:
"It only need be stated here that the testimony of Mr. Howlett in that respect flies in the
face of uncontroverted physical facts and therefore is not substantial evidence."
Also see SPANG vs. COTE, 68 A. ( 2d) 823, (Me) and
DOMINGUEZ vs. AMERICAN CASUALTY CO. (Louisiana) 47 So. (2d) 72. The last two cases are also authorities that a person must drive so he can see objects on
the highway within the range of his lights.
Certainly the driver was traveling too fast under
the circumstances with which he was confronted and
further with the fact that he had been over the road a
thousand times. He knew the place and he knew all the
curves in the road.
This Court has had this question before them a number of times, and we submit that under the facts and
circumstances as they were presented by the defendant
himself, that he w.as guilty of negligence as a matter of
law.
There are a nu1nber of Utah cases dealing with this
proposition, as to when a person is guilty of negligence
as a 1natter of la"'"- They are familiar to this Court,
but we think it advisable to review them.
In the· O'BRIEN vs. ALSTON ET AL case, 61 U.
368, 213 P. 791. At page 792 this Court says:
20
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"Independent of any statute, it is negligence
to run an automobile on a highway at night without sufficient lights to enable the driver to see
objects ahead of him in time to avoid them."
This Court in the case of NIKOLEROPOULOS vs.
RAMSEY, 61 U. 465, 214 P. 304 held that it was error
to refuse the following instructions:
"A driver of an automobile at night is required to use such reasonable and ordinary care,
to have his machine under such control as to not
overtake and run down people within the range
of his lights, as would be used by a man of average and reasonable care and prudence in his
situation."
DALLEY vs. MID-WESTERN DAIRY PRODUCTS CO. E·T AL., 80 U. 331, 15 P. (2d) 309. This
Court held that it was negligence for an automobile
driver who collided with a truck parked on a highway
without lights was negligent as a matter of law. We quote
from page 310 of the Pac.
"In this jurisdiction the doctrine is established "that it is negligence as matter of law for
a person to drive an automobile upon a traveled
public highway, used by vehicles and pedestrians,
at such a rate of speed that said automobile cannot
be stopped within the distance at which the opera~or of said car is able to see objects upon the
highway in front of him." In the case of Nikoleropoulos vs. Ramsey, 61 Utah, 465, 214 P. 304, the
language just quoted is said to be a correct statement of the law and that the refusal of the trial
court to so instruct the jury was prejudicial error.
In the case of O'Brien vs. Alston, 61 Utah, 368,
213 P. 791, 792, it is said:
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. "But entirely apart from any statutory req~Irements, the law requires that, if a person deSires to operate his automobile on the public
streets or highways after dark he must see to it
t~t it i~ equipped with proper: suitable, and sufficient lights, so that the operator may discover
any objects or obstructions that may be encountered on the highway."
In the case of HANSEN vs. CLYDE, 89 U. 31, 56
P. ( 2d) 1366, this Court says at page 1369 of the Pac. :
"When a driver upon a public highway with
his light equipment cannot see more than 50 feet
ahead of him, it is his duty to drive at such speed
as will enable him to stop within that distance.
Dalley vs. Mid-Western Dairy Products Co., 80
Utah, 331, 15 P. (2d) 309."
In the case of NIELSON vs. WATANABE 90 U.
401, 62 P. (2d) 117, the Supreme Court cited and discussed the O'brien vs. Alston case 61 U. 368, 213 P. 791;
Nikoleropoulos vs. Ran1sey, 61 r~. 465, 214 P. 304, 306;
Dalley vs. l\Iid- estern Dairy Products Co., 80 U. 331,
15 P. (2d) 309, and did not modify the doctrine therein
set out, but distinguished the facts in that case in that
the person was blinded by lights coming from the opposite direction. The exception n1ade in the N"ielson vs.
Watanabe case had no bearing on the present case because hy the Defendanfs o'Yn evidence in instant case,
thP 1nap and the photographs and by Plaintiff's evidence,
the Osborne car "?as rlearly Yisable for 400 feet and there
were no lights coining fron1 the opposite direction~ the
night was clear; the pavement was dry.

''r
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The NIELSON vs. WATANABE case, 90 U. 401,
62 P. (2d) 117, held as set out in the headnote number
4, as follows at page 118 of the Pac.:
"It is negligence as a matter of law for a
person to drive automobile at such speed that
automobile cannot be stopped within distance at
which driver of automobile is able to see objects
on highway in front of him."
To the same effect as the Nielson vs. Watanabe
case 90 U. 401, 62 P. (2d) 117, is the cas~ of MOSS
vs. CHRISTENSEN-GARDNER, INC. 98 U. 253, 98 P.
(2d) 363, holding that the person was blinded by lights
coming from the opposite direction and therefore distinguishes it on the facts, but reaffirms the rule in the
Nikoleropoulos case and the Mid-VVestern Dairy Products
Co. case.
In the case of FARRELL vs. CAMERON 98 U. 68,
94 P. (2d) 1068, the Court held, headnote 3:
"In action for injuries to passenger in automobile colliding with defendant's automobile,
facts found by trial court held to warrant his
finding that defendant had ample time after
seeing other automobile approaching when 100
feet away to turn slightly to right and avoid
collision."
In the instant case, there is no reason why the
Defendant should not have swerved his car and avoided
the collision if he had been driving within the distance
in which he could see objects on the road.
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In the case of TRIMBLE ET UX. vs. UNION
PACIFIC STAGES ET AL. 105 U. 457, 142 P. (2d)
67 4, they set out the rule of law in this state to be:
we quote from page 676 of the Pac:
"In support of the contention that the court
should have instructed that as a matter of law
defendant was guilty of negligence. These cases
lay down the rule that it is the duty of a driver of
a motor vehicle moving along the highway at
night to so drive his vehicle that he can stop
before colliding with any object within the range
of his headlights. And further, if the lights with
which the vehicle is equipped are not up to the
standard set by law, the driver must reduce his
speed proportionately. Failure to observe this
standard of care is negligence as a matter of law.'~
The Court then goes on to distinguish the case in that
Defendant ran into a fog and that it was similar to the
Nielson vs, Watanabe, 90 U. 401, 62 P. (2d) 117, 119.
There is no fog or light in the instant case.
In the WRIGHT 'Ts. MAYNARD case, 120 U. 504,
235 P. (2d) 916, this Court said at page 917:
"In Dalley vs. Midwestern Dairy Products
Co., 80 Utah 331, 15 P. 2d 309, 310, a case in
which the plaintiff ran into a truck parked on
the highway without lights, this court declared
that it was the established law of this state,
quoting from Nikoleropoulos vs. Ramsey, 61 Utah
465, 214 P. 304: "That it is negligence as a n1atter
of law for a person to drive an automobile upon
a traveled public highway, used by vehicles ~d
pedestrians, at such a. rate of speed that sru.d
automobile cannot be stopped within the distance
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at which the operator of said car is able to see
objects upon the highway in front of him."
And the Court goes on further to distinguish the above
set out rule in the Wright vs. Maynard case saying
that the driver did see the Defendant in time to do something about it and that he did do something about it,
which was he swerved to the right and if the Defendant
had not stepped into his w.ay, that he would have avoided
the accident. In this case, the Osborne car remained
in the same place and the girls remained in the same
position according to Defendant and Parry, and the
driver of the car ran into them.
In the case of HODGES vs. WAITE 2 U. (2d)
152, 270 P. (2d) 461, the Court again .affirms the rule
in the Nikoleropoulos vs. Ramsey case, 61 U. 465, 214
P. 304; and the Dalley vs. Mid-Western Dairy Products
Co. case 80 U. 331, 15 P. (2d) 309, and distinguishes on
the fact that the Defendant, while rounding a SHARP
CURVE in Logan Canyon, after seeing the truck,
swerved his truck to the left; but could not avoid striking
the rear of the trailer.
There is no SHARP CURVE in the case at bar,
you can tell this from Defendant's own photograph,
which was taken 200 feet away from the point of the
accident, that there was nothing to obstruct the view.
You can tell from Defendant's map, (Ex. 32) and from
all the pictures in evidence, that there was nothing to
obstruct the view and the testimony of Professor Harris
and others that the car could be seen from 400 to 500
feet. Any testimony that the car could not be seen is
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contrary to the physical facts and is not worthy of
belief. See page 20 of this brief for authorities.
So instant case does not come within the exception in
the Hodges vs. Waite case.
In the HORSLEY vs. ROBINSON, 112 U. 227, 186
P. (2d) 592, this Court, speaking through Justice Wade
sets out section 57-7-113 U. C. A. 1943 which provides:
" (a) No person shall drive a vehicle on a
highway at a speed greater than is reasonable
and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and potential hazards then
existing. In every event speed shall be so controlled as may be necessary to avoid colliding
with any person, vehicle, or other conveyance on
or entering the highway in compliance ·with legal
requirements and the duty of all persons to use
due care. • * * * * * * •
" (c) The driver of every vehicle shall, * • •
drive at an appropriate reduced speed * • • when
special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians
or other traffic or by reason of weather or highway conditions."
And from page 597, second column, the Court cites with
approval as follows:
"In Nikoleropoulos v-s. Rrunse~.,., 61 Utah 465,
214 P. 304, the defendant "~as driving his car a.t
night during a hea.,~~ rain storn1 at about 12 ~es
per hour; in the distance the lights of oncommg
cars reflected on the wet pavement into his eyes
so that at the thne of the accident he was unable
to see the plaintiff walking on the pavement in
front of him until he "'"as within 6 feet and then
it was too late to avoid running him down. We
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held that defendant was negligent as a matter of
law no matter how dark and stormy the night
' bad the visability, if he drove at such a
or how
rate of speed that he was unable to avoid running
plaintiff down within the distance plaintiff could
be seen walking ahead of defendant's car on the
highway. To the same effect see: Dalley vs. MidWestern Dairy Products Co., 80 Utah 331, 15 P.
2d 309; Haarstrich vs. Oregon Short Line R. Co.,
70 Utah 552, 262 P. 100; O'Brien vs. Alston, 61
Utah 368, 213 P. 791.
The Nikoleropoulos vs. Ramsey case is in
substance a holding that it is negligence to operate
a vehicle on the highway at any time without
having it under sufficient control so that others
using the highway will not be unreasonably endangered thereby, regardless of how slow it is
required to travel to accomplish that end."
In the case of TAKATARO SHIBA vs. WEISS, 3
U. (2d) 256, 282· P. (2d) 341, the Court reaffirms the
doctrine we are contending for and speaking through
Justice Wade says as follows on page 342 of the Pac.:
"The facts in the instant case are very similar
to those in Dalley vs. Midwestern Dairy Products
Co., 80 Utah 331, 15 P. 2d 309, where this Court
held that the driver of a car which ran into a
parked truck under such conditions was negligent
as a matter of law."
After a review of the Utah case it appears therefrom that it is still negligence as a matter of law in
the state of Utah to drive your automobile at such a
rate of speed that you cannot see objects on the highway
in front of you.
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The cases that have been distinguished are the ones
in which the driver has been blinded by lights coming
from the opposite direction which does not apply in
this case because there were no cars coming from the
opposite direction; or where there is fog which does
not apply in this case because it was a clear night and
vision was not obstructed, and no fog.
The other exception was the case in which there
was a SHARP CURVE in the canyon and this does not
apply in this ·case because there was only a slight curve.
The physical facts are so that any testimony to the
contrary is not worthy of belief.
POL~T

II.

THE COURT IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY
AND FAILED TO GIVE THE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTIONS.

The argument which Plaintiff will make in regards
to Point Nu1nber 2 "ill also apply to Points Numbered
5, 7 and 8.
Instruction 6-a (R. 69) is erroneous and ambiguous.
The Court lays down the general rule of stopping within
the range of the headlights, and then qualifies it by the
following language:
"But in connection with this instruction you
must consider the evidence of the highway and
the conditions to determine 'vhether the lights
would shine on the high,vay far enough ahead
for the driver to stop before the in1pact in this
case occurred."
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The physical facts and the uncontradicted facts in this
case are such that this qualification should not have been
given.
The Court further qualifies the general rule by the
following language :
"This rule of law that I have given you does
not apply on a curve but only on a section that
is sufficient straight for a person to stop within
350 feet which is the required range of their
head lights."
What does the Court mean by a curve~ Does it mean
a one degree, two degree, five degree, forty-five degree
or a ninety degre·e curve~ Does the Court mean that after
you have come around a ninety degree curve that you
have 350 feet before you have to see objects in the road~
Does the Court mean that on a one degree curve the
general rule does not apply and that you have 350 feet
in which to stop your car if any object is in front of
you~

When you look at Defendant's map, (Ex. 32), Defendants pictures and Plaintiff's pictures and the oral
evidence, it is apparent that such an instruction should
not have been given.
Section 41-6-134 of the Utah Code Annotated 1953
provides:
(a) "There shall be an uppermost distribution of light, or composite beam so aimed and of
such intensity as to reveal persons and vehicles
at a distance of at least 350 feet ahead for all
conditions of loading."
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By instruction 6-a (R. 69) the jury was told that
any curve in which your lights would not show objects
350 feet ahead of you and if you hit such objects, you are
not negligent. We think this instruction is erroneous.
We submit that instruction 6-a does not state Utah law
and that such an instruction should not have been given
under the facts in this case.
Instruction 6-d (R. 72) pertains to the intoxication
of the driver of the car. In contrast to that, the Court
in instruction number 12 (R. 79) states:
"You may consider her'' (Plaintiff) "condition of sobriety in connection with the problem
of why she did not move back."
Immediately thereafter, in instruction number 13, (79 B)
the Court instructs on intoxication as against the pedestrian which is entirely more severe than instruction 6-d
(R. 72) and emphasizes intoxication as to the plaintiff
and minimizes it as to the defendant. Instruction number
14 (R. 80) pertains to both of the parties drinking. The
way these instructions are given and the way they are
located over emphasize drinking and intoxication as to
the Plaintiff and 1ninimize intoxication as to the Defendant and is certainly highly prejudicial. This is a mighty
touehy point before a jury.
In instruction nu1nber 6-e, (R. 73) the Court says
that Kenneth R. Parry's not having a drivers license
can not be considered as appro:xin1ate cause of Plaintiff's injuries. This nullifies the effect that Kenneth R.
l~arry had been drinking that night and was driving
a car when he had no license to drive it, and that his
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license to drive was revoked because of drunken driving.
This factor should be considered in the c.ase, but by
instruction number 6-e, it is practically eliminated from
the deliberation of the jury.
Instruction number 9, (R. 76) entirely leaves out the
question of driving within the distance that the Defendant could see with his lights. We called this matter
to the Court's attention in our request for instruction
number 22, (R. 61) where we set out the various things
upon which the court should instruct and we feel this
in the light of the other instruction was very prejudicial.
In instruction number 11 (R. 78), the court says:
"It is no legal excuse for the Plaintiff to
say that she did not look or to say that she did
not see at a time when by reasonable care an
ordinary prudent person would have seen."
In the next instruction, number 12, (R. 79) the Court
states that :
"the plaintiff admitted that she saw the car
coming and did not move; she claims that at first
she thought she was safe and later she was unable to move."
Certainly there was no reason to give instruction
number 11 in the light of number 12, and that over
emphasizes the duty of the Plaintiff to look and was
highly prejudicial. Throughout the instructions to the
jury, the court has over emphasized the duty of the
Plaintiff and minimized the duty of the Defendant.
Instruction number 15, (R. 80 A) is a very interesting question. The Court instructed that they should
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not consider insurance, but do they intend to have the
adjustor, who went to the place and took pictures, not
considered as an interested party in the law suit when
the insurance company is actually responsible to pay
any judgment up to the limits of their policy~
We asked the Court in our requested instruction
number 1 (R. 40) to instruct the jury that Defendant
was guilty of negligence as a matter of law.
On the motion for a new trial, Plaintiff argued
to the Court that the Defendant was guilty of negligence as a matter of law and, therefore, the Court should
grant a new trial which the trial court failed to do.
The Court should have given Plaintiff's requested
instruction 2, (R. 41) without the exceptions, as the
Court did in instruction number 6-a heretofore discussed.
The Court should have given the Plaintiff's requested instructions 8 and 9, (R. 47, 48). That if the
Defendant had been keeping a proper look out, he would
have seen Plaintiff in plenty of time to have swerved
to the left and avoided hitting the Plaintiff. We were
also entitled to instructions nun1bers 8 and 9 under
the last clear chance doctrine and on the facts and
authoriti0~ of BECI{STR(l~I Y. ''TILLIA~IS, 3 U. (2d)
210, 282 P. (2d) 309. Under the facts 8Jld the reasoning
in the Beckstrom rase, the driver of the automobile in
the instant case had sufficient time to avoid hitting
Plaintiff.
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Instruction number 14, (R. 53) said as follows:
"You are instructed that the law provides
that a persons automobile must be equipped with
lights so as to reveal persons and vehicles at a
distance of at least 350 feet ahead."
This is the Utah law as set out in section 41-6-134 Utah
Code Annotated 1953, and under the Defendants' testimony in this case that he .and his agent could only see
from 75 to 80 feet with their lights. This instruction
should have been given or the Court should have instructed as a matter of law, that the Defendant was
negligent.
Plaintiff's requested instruction number 10, (R. 49)
states that the driver of an automobile should be careful because he is driving a vehicle which is able to
inflict serious injuries or death, and we think the case
of COOMBS vs. PERRY, 2 U. (2d) 381, 275 P. (2d)
680 is in point where on page 682 of the Pac. the Court
says:
"It is to be borne in mind that although the
motorist and pedestrian are both required to exercise the same standard of care, that of the ordinary prudent person under the circumstances, that
standard imposes upon the motorist a greater
amount of caution than upon the pedestrian because of the potential danger to others in the
operation of an automobile."
As an illustration of the Courts' instructions being
more favorable to the Defendant, take example instruction number 2, (R. 64). The Court says as to the Plaintiff:
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"The plaintiff in this case has the burden
of showing BY A PREPONDERANCE of the
evidence that the defendant was negligent."
and as to the Defendant, the Court says:
.
"And the defendant has the burden of provIng that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent."
but did not add the words, "by a preponderance of the
evidence."
Instruction number 8, (75A) on sympathy only mentions the Plaintiff and doesn't mention the Defendant.
It is unilateral. It tells the jury by innuendo that the
Plaintiff doesn't have a case. We ask this Court to please
compare it with the instruction given on sympathy in
the suggested Uniform Jury Instructions of the Utah
State Bar which is as follows:
"4. (BAJI 4.)
RE: SYMPATHY, PREJUDICE, PASSION
You must weigh and consider this case without regard to sympathy, prejudice, or passion
for or against (ANY) (EITHER) party to the
action."
Whieh instruction "~as taken from California Jury Instructions, Civil, Volume 1, page 54, number 4, which
quotes the above and the note says:
''This instruction given: Gray vs. Brinkerhoff, 249 P. 2d 571, 41 Cal. 2d 180, 258 P. 2d 834."
Key nun1ber: Trial 217, 232 (3).
We think that because of the errors made in the
instructions and because of the over emphasizing of the
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instructions in Defendant's favor, that the Plaintiff was
prejudiced and this Court should g:vant a new trial and
the following authorities so hold.
In the case of JENSEN vs. UTAH RY CO. 72 U.
366, 270 P. 349. On page 355, the court says as follows:
"and in such particular invokes the rule stated
in Konold vs. Rio Grande W. Ry. Co., 21 U.
379, 60 P. 1021, 81 Am. St. Rep. 693, that the
giving of inconsistent instructions is error and
sufficient ground for a reversal of the judgment,
because, after verdict, it cannot be told which
instruction was followed by the jury, or what
influence the erroneous instruction had on their
deliberations, and, as stated in Randall, Instructions to Juries, 537, that where instructions of
the successful party state an erroneous rule, and
those of the defeated party state the rule correctly, the only presumption permissible is that
the jury disregard the true rule for the false; that
an error of an instruction presenting a wrong
theory of the case is not cured by other instructions announcing a right theory; and that, where
instructions are in irreconcilable .conflict, or so
conflicting as to confuse or mislead the jury,
the rule requiring instructions to be, read together
has no application."
On page 357, the court says as follows:
"The rule is well settled that instructing a
jury as a mere abstract or general statement as
to the law should be avoided, and that all instructions should be applicable to evidence on either
one or the other of the respective theories of the
parties."
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And also on page 358 the court says as follows:
"Thus the charge falls within the familiar
rule that it is error to give instructions based on
a state of facts which there is no evidence tending
to prove, or which the undisputed evidence in
the case shows did not exist, even though such
instructions contain correct statements of law."
In the case of SHIELDS vs. UTAH LIGHT &
TRACTION CO. 99 U. 307, 105 P. (2d) 347, the court
held it is prejudicial error to emphasize certain portions
in favor of one party and the court says on page 349,
second column:
"Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the
plaintiff by copying into her complaint certain
sections of our statute (with the hope, no doubt,
that the trial judge would include the same in
the instructions relating to the pleadings) has
been able to secure, in effect, an emphasis upon
certain propositions of law as against others
which are entitled to equal weight."
In the case of DEv~NE vs. COOK, 3 U. (2d), 134,
279 P. 1073, the headnote 5, states as follows:
''In automobile accident case, instructions
stating that contributory negligence which in any
degree contributed to accident, or in any degree
proxhnately contributed to accident to any extent,
however slight, would be a defense was prejudicially erroneous, in vie": of other instructions
concerning contributory negligence."
And on pngP 1075, the eourt stated:
"The instructions prejudicially accentuated
the duty of the plaintiffs and 1ninimized the duty
of the defendants."
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POINT III.
THE COURT ERRORED IN ADMITTING CERTAIN
TESTIMONIES.

POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRORED IN EXCLUDING CERTAIN
TESTIMONIES.

These two points will be treated together.
Plaintiff offered in evidence the hospital records
and certain x-rays which the Court refused. Exhibit sheet
(R. 62). These records were identified by Hortense Wood
(R. 172, 173), the custodian of the records at the St.
Mark's Hospital. Dr. Lamb testified from them. (R. 199,
200, 201, 203, 204, 207, 208). They showed the condition
of the Plaintiff and showed the basis of her treatment and
would also come under the rule of law of records being
made in the regular course of business and should have
been admitted in evidence.
The Court allowed the insurance adjuster, Lyle
Bates, to mark on the photographs and to give his
opinion about the blood spots, anti-freeze spot and skid
marks which should not have been allowed. (R. 337, 339,
350).
CONCLUSION
We believe that the Defendant was guilty of negligence as a matter of law and the Court should have
so instructed the jury, failing to do this the Court should
have granted Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial.
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Bec.ause of the exception that the Court made to
the rule that a person must drive within the distance
in which he could see objects on the road. Because of
the various erroneous instructions. Because of the
Court's over emphasizing the duty of the Plaintiff and
minimizing the duty of the Defendant. Because the
Court over emphasized intoxication as to the Plaintiff
and minimized it .as to the Defendant, prevented the
Plaintiff from having a fair trial. For all or any one
of these reasons, the case should be remanded to the
District Court for a new trial.
We, therefore, respectfully submit that the judgment
of the lower court should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

GOLDEN W. ROBBINS,
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Appellant
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